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GORDON GEKKO TO THE RESCUE?: INSIDER TRADING
AS A TOOL TO COMBAT ACCOUNTING FRAUD
Robert E. Wagner*
This Article puts forward that, counter-intuitively, one way to help
avoid future accounting scandals such as WorldCom would be the
legalization of “fraud-inhibiting insider trading.” Fraud-inhibiting
insider trading is the subcategory of insider trading where: (1)
information is present that would have a price-decreasing effect on
stock if made public; (2) the traded stock belongs to an individual who
will likely suffer financial injury from a subsequent stock price
reduction if the trading does not take place; (3) the individual on
whose behalf the trading occurs would have the ability to prevent the
release of the information or to release distorted information to the
public; and (4) the individual in question did not commit any
fraudulent activities prior to availing himself of the safe harbor.
Arguing that prohibiting all insider trading incentivizes corporate
fraud, this Article begins by giving examples from recent cases in
which insider trading could have been used to avoid significant harm.
Next, the Article briefly discusses both the history of insider trading
and the philosophical and policy arguments against it. This Article
particularly focuses on the two most prominent arguments raised
against insider trading: (1) that it erodes confidence in the market; and
(2) that it is similar to theft and should be prosecuted accordingly.
Previously unexamined empirical evidence suggests that the
confidence argument may be incorrect and does not suffice to justify a
prohibition on fraud-inhibiting insider trading. This Article also
shows that while the property rights rationale is the strongest position
against general insider trading, it is an insufficient basis to outlaw
fraud-inhibiting insider trading. The Article concludes with a proposal
that the courts, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or Congress
enact a safe harbor to legalize fraud-inhibiting insider trading and
thus enable the insider trading laws to more effectively achieve their
purported goal of protecting the securities market and investors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last ten years have been marked by financial scandals, resulting
in WorldCom and Enron becoming household names. While legislation
such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act seeks to avert future disasters, little
attention has been paid to the complex relationship between accounting
fraud and the existing blanket prohibition against insider trading. This
Article will argue, however, that one can possibly trace some of the most
significant recent instances of corporate fraud to this prohibition. As a
consequence, the Article will propose the tailoring of the relevant
regulations to allow “fraud-inhibiting insider trading.”
Federal law prohibits using inside information when buying or selling
stocks of publicly traded corporations. 1 While some commentators have
argued that insider trading has beneficial effects both for the securities
market and the general economy, 2 these defenses have been the
exception rather than the rule. 3 The accusations against insider trading
have ranged from general accusations that any gains made based on

1. Inside information is often defined as “the use of material nonpublic information in trading
the shares of a company by a corporate insider or other person who owes a fiduciary duty to the
company.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 866 (9th ed. 2009).
2. These arguments were first made more than forty years ago in Henry Manne’s seminal work,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
3. For one such defense, see Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
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inside information are inherently “unfair” or a form of “cheating,” 4 to
arguments that insider trading causes a loss of confidence on the part of
investors and results in reduced trading in an apparently unjust market. 5
This Article will show, however, that many of these attacks are both
vague and may even be contrary to the empirical data available.
Insider trading regulation has been praised by Congress and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as one of the “central
pillars” and proudest accomplishments of American securities law. 6
Yet, not only is evidence of the beneficial impact of such regulation
lacking both in quantity and quality, but there has been near-universal
acceptance of the idea that if any insider trading is regulated, it should
all be regulated. For example, the law has failed to distinguish between
price-increasing insider trading and price-decreasing insider trading. 7
Price-increasing insider trading is trading based on information that,
when released, will raise the stock price of the securities in question;
conversely, price-decreasing insider trading is trading on information
that, when released, will lower the price of the securities. 8 As one
scholar points out, there are stronger arguments for regulating priceincreasing insider trading than its counterpart because “price-decreasing
insider trading provides significantly more value to investors than priceincreasing insider trading [and combats] the problem of overvalued
equity.” 9
This Article specifically addresses the subcategory of pricedecreasing insider trading that qualifies as fraud-inhibiting insider
trading and for which there is the least justification for prohibition. 10
The proposal here would allow insider trading in settings where: (1)
price-decreasing information is present; (2) the traded stock belongs to
an individual who himself (or his immediate family) will likely suffer
financial injury from a subsequent stock price reduction if the trading
does not take place; (3) the individual on whose behalf the trading
occurs would have the ability to prevent the release of the information or
could release distorted information to the public; and (4) the individual
in question did not commit any fraudulent activities prior to availing
4. STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 235 (2006).
5. See infra Parts IV & VI.
6. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1589, 1589 (1999).
7. For a good discussion of these two types of trading, see Thomas A. Lambert, Overvalued
Equity and the Case for an Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045 (2006).
8. Id. at 1048.
9. Id.
10. Id. (defining price-decreasing versus price-increasing insider trading).
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himself of the safe harbor. To defend the proposal, Part II of this Article
demonstrates the detrimental effects of existing regulations via a
description of the well-known WorldCom case and the contrasting
example provided by the Supercuts case. Part III presents fraudinhibiting insider trading itself in more detail. In Part IV, the Article
discusses the legal history of insider trading regulation. Part V briefly
presents how deontological and contractarian theories view insider
trading, and then focuses on utilitarian theories to justify allowing fraudinhibiting insider trading. Part VI of this Article addresses some of the
classic arguments for prohibiting insider trading, with an emphasis on
the market confidence and property rights rationales. Part VII responds
to some of the other objections against insider trading and illustrates the
benefits of allowing fraud-inhibiting insider trading. In conclusion, this
Article briefly discusses the ability of the SEC, federal courts, and
Congress to implement an exception to the general prohibition against
insider trading in fraud-inhibiting insider trading situations.
II. TWO CONTRASTING EXAMPLES
Before examining the arguments in favor of and opposed to insider
trading, it is helpful to look at two recent cases that demonstrate the
possible ramifications of insider trading. The first instance is from the
now-infamous case of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Bernard Ebbers
and his company WorldCom. 11 When looking at this case, one of the
first questions that comes to mind is how a one-time teacher, coach, and
warehouse manager 12 became a leader in one of corporate America’s
biggest frauds. It is instructive to first examine the crime itself to
understand what drove Bernard Ebbers to commit these actions.
WorldCom was a gigantic telecommunications company with about
90,000 employees in sixty-five countries and with reported revenues of

11. The circumstances surrounding the WorldCom scandal are not unique. A similar situation
occurred at Doral Financial Corporation, which resulted in a conviction in April 2010. In that case,
Mario Levis, the former treasurer and senior executive vice president for Doral Financial Corporation,
was convicted for his role in defrauding investors and ultimately causing a four-billion dollar decline in
his company’s shares. See David Glovin & Thom Weidlich, Doral’s Levis Found Guilty in SecuritiesFraud Case (Update2), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 29, 2010, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/doral-s-levis-found-guilty-in-securities-fraud-caseupdate2-.html. Mr. Levis indicated in annual financial statements that the company was increasing in
value year after year, until 2005 when he announced an approximate $97.5 million write-down in the
corporation’s value and thus triggered a decline in its share price that resulted in a net loss of 70% of the
corporation’s total stock value. Id. Mr. Levis’s family shareholdings had totaled more than 8% of the
company’s total shares. Id.
12. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2006).
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approximately $39 billion as of 2000. 13 Three issues started causing
problems for WorldCom in 2000; first, when the “dot-com bubble”
burst, many of WorldCom’s customers had difficulty paying their
telecommunications bills; second, there simply were fewer companies
for WorldCom to pursue as clients; and third, continued growth through
acquisition was limited—the Department of Justice and the European
Union had stopped a proposed purchase of Sprint due to antitrust
concerns—and as a result of these problems, WorldCom found it
increasingly difficult to fulfill stock market projections for its revenue. 14
By the third quarter of 2000, Ebbers was informed that the company
may need to tell investors that WorldCom would not meet its financial
expectations. 15 Ebbers found this unacceptable and informed his
subordinates that they had to “hit [their] numbers,” 16 meaning they had
to publish revenue reports that conformed to what had been projected by
Wall Street experts. Hence, they reported an additional $133 million in
anticipated revenue collection even though they knew they were not
going to receive that money.17 Shortly thereafter, Ebbers was informed
that WorldCom’s “line cost expenses” would be almost $1 billion more
than the company had anticipated, and he again responded that the
company had to “hit its quarterly earnings estimates.” 18 In response to
his demands, the reported expenses were falsely lowered by almost $825
million, and WorldCom’s reported earnings falsely went up by the same
amount. 19 Over the next several quarters, this pattern continued—
expenses were higher than expected while revenues were lower—and
Ebbers would instruct his financial team to alter figures and classify
debts in such a way as to avoid “missing” the financial expectations. 20
It is significant to keep in mind that during much of this time,
WorldCom grew. For example, in the third quarter of 2001, the revenue
growth rate was about 5.5%, but it was still lower than expected and was
artificially made to appear to be 12%. 21 Another factor to remember is
that during this time, a potential merger with Verizon was on the table,
which could have been very beneficial to WorldCom employees and
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 114.
16. Ken Belson & Seth Schiesel, Did the Buck Stop Anywhere?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at
C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/04/business/04ebbers.html?pagewanted=1&_r=
1&ref=bernard_j_ebbers.
17. Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 114.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 114–16.
21. Id. at 116.
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shareholders, but Ebbers abruptly ended it due to his fear that Verizon
would discover WorldCom’s fraudulent accounting practices. 22 Finally,
in the first quarter of 2002, even the fraudulent accounting practices
were not enough to claim that WorldCom had hit its numbers, and
WorldCom announced that its results had fallen below expectations.23
In April 2002, Ebbers was forced to resign, and shortly thereafter an
internal audit discovered and exposed the fraudulent practices. 24 In June
2002, WorldCom informed the public of the fraud, and its stock
collapsed, losing 90% of its value and forcing WorldCom into
bankruptcy. 25
To answer why Bernard Ebbers did this, one must take a look at his
personal finances. Bernard Ebbers was extremely wealthy by the time
WorldCom began to experience difficulties in 2000. 26 Unfortunately for
Ebbers (and ultimately for WorldCom shareholders), his desires
exceeded his income. Ebbers purchases included an enormous ranch,
timber lands, and a yacht-building company, and his loans totaled over
$400 million. 27 To secure these loans, he used millions of shares of
WorldCom stock as collateral. 28 Any time the price of WorldCom stock
went down, he needed more cash or assets to maintain his collateral. At
one of WorldCom’s financial meetings, Ebbers told his employees that
“his ‘lifeblood was in the stock of the company’ and that if the price fell
below approximately $12 per share, he would be wiped out financially
by margin calls.” 29 Bernard Ebbers could not allow WorldCom’s stock
price to fall even if it was realistically inevitable that this would
eventually occur. As Judge Winter stated, “[t]he methods used were
specifically intended to create a false picture of profitability even for
professional analysts that, in Ebbers’s case, was motivated by his
personal financial circumstances.” 30
One may wonder why Ebbers did not sell all or some of his stock as
soon as he first found out that WorldCom would not meet its
expectations, which would have allowed him to obtain cash to secure his
loans. Part of why he insisted on “hitting numbers” and on “his
22. Ken Belson, Ebbers Avoided Verizon Deal, Trial Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at C12,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/11/business/11ebbers.html?ref=bernard_j_ebbers.
23. Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 114, 116.
24. Id. at 117.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 113.
27. Ebbers Defense Closing Argument: It’s Sullivan’s Fault, Mar. 4, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,149310,00.html.
28. Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 113.
29. Id. at 116.
30. Id. at 130.
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lifeblood” being in the stock of the company is simply that insider
trading regulations prohibited him from selling his stock in this
situation. His choices were limited at that point: he could allow the
reduction in stock value to destroy him financially, or he could pretend
that there was nothing wrong and hope that he could find a solution
before anyone figured out he was fudging the numbers. He opted for the
latter and ultimately caused not only the decline in stock value but the
loss of billions of dollars and damage to thousands of lives. In July
2002, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which made it the largest bankruptcy in
American history. 31 WorldCom’s collapse hurt a large group of
investors, including the largest state pension fund in the country—the
California public employees’ retirement system—which lost a reported
$580 million in the WorldCom meltdown. 32
Further, when a
corporation is devastated like Enron or WorldCom, the employees
themselves are hit the hardest because they are often unable to diversify
their investments, and many have their retirements wrapped up in the
company’s stock. 33
It should be noted that Bernard Ebbers was not alone in this
fraudulent activity. In fact, WorldCom Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
Scott Sullivan helped perpetrate WorldCom’s $11 billion accounting
fraud because he wanted to maintain his $700,000 salary, $10 million
bonus, and his stock options. 34 Therefore, both Ebbers and Sullivan
participated in the fraud to secure, or at least attempt to secure, their own
finances. As one scholar stated, “[o]nce there are pressures put on
profits, the obvious incentive for management to maintain their lifestyle
or their stock prices is to fiddle with the books.” 35 Unfortunately, this
“fiddling” injures many more people than just those committing the

31. John Gibeaut, As WorldCom Turns, Cases Pile Up, 90 A.B.A. J. 40, 48 (2004).
32. Amanda Ripley, Cynthia Cooper: The Night Detective, TIME MAG., Dec. 30, 2002, at 45,
available at www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1003990,00.html.
33. AFL–CIO, WORLDCOM’S COLLAPSE AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR WORKERS’ RETIREMENT
SECURITY 1 (2002), http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/resources/upload/worldcom401-kreport.pdf
(noting that most WorldCom employees just had a 401(k) plan and that many of them invested all or
most of their 401(k) assets in WorldCom stock); Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word out About Fraud: A
Theoretical Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1930–31 (2007)
(pointing out that when Enron fell, over 4,500 employees lost their jobs and 60% of Enron’s employees
had their retirements as undiversified investments in Enron stock).
34. Lisa H. Nicholson, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Purported Over-Criminalization of Corporate
Offenders, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 43, 53 (2007) (citing Jennifer Bayot & Roben Farzad, Ex-WorldCom
Officer Sentenced to Five Years in Accounting Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at C1).
35. Kurt Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will Be Scandal. Count on It., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2002, at C1 (quoting Stephen L. Meagher), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/16/news/
economy-business-after-a-boom-there-will-be-scandal-count-on-it.html.
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fraud. The collapse of large corporations does not only hurt investors,
but also innocent employees, small suppliers, local communities, and
philanthropic organizations. 36 The last wave of corporate scandals,
including both WorldCom and Enron, ultimately resulted in billions of
dollars of stockholder losses and the loss of tens of thousands of jobs.37
In Enron’s case alone, 6,500 people became unemployed. 38
Commentators have argued that executives like those at Enron and
WorldCom should have “found the courage” to acknowledge the
overvaluation of the company rather than engage in the fraudulent
activities that resulted in the corporations’ total demise. 39 The position
seems to be that more executives should behave like Toby Lenk, who
lost approximately $850 million when he refused to sell his stock
although he and the general public knew that his company eToys was
failing (even at the point where insider trading laws would not have
precluded him from selling). 40 Lenk reportedly made a conscious
decision to put his “personal well-being on the line in order to build a
company.” 41 Yet, we do not live in a world full of such altruists. While
it is possible that a CEO or CFO aware of lower-than-expected reported
revenues could simply accept that his or her personal financial wellbeing
was going to be potentially devastated, he or she may often take less
savory courses of action.
There are many examples of insiders that, while not quite acting like
Bernard Ebbers, took one of the other available options that society
discourages. 42 A typical case concerned David Lipson, who became the
subject of litigation in SEC v. Lipson. 43 In early 1995, Lipson, the CEO
of Supercuts 44 was informed that revenues were running lower and
expenses higher than expected. 45 He sold 365,000 shares of Supercuts
stock for $9 per share and then publicly released the poor financial

36. Macey, supra note 33, at 1901. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity,
34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 7 (2005) (noting that when companies sink, they also destroy the social value that they
signified in the forms of jobs, products, and services).
37. Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 222 (2004).
38. Id. at 225.
39. Jensen, supra note 36, at 11.
40. Michael Sokolove, How to Lose $850 Million—and Not Really Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 64, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/magazine/how-to-lose850-million-and-not-really-care.html.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2008); SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12
(1st Cir. 2004).
43. 278 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2002).
44. Supercuts is a chain of hair-cutting salons.
45. Lipson, 278 F.3d at 659.
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information. 46 The Supercuts stock dropped to a low of $6.50 per share
and recovered to $7.62 per share by the end of the week. 47 The SEC
sued Lipson for violating insider trading rules and recovered $621,875
(the amount that the court determined Lipson had avoided losing), plus
$348,097 in interest fees, and $1,865,625, or three times the amount
saved, in punitive damages. 48
When one contrasts the results of the Supercuts and WorldCom
scenarios, most investors would agree that they would prefer the results
of the insider trading that occurred in the Supercuts case as opposed to
the utter devastation to which the lack of insider trading contributed in
the WorldCom case. The insider trading that took place in the Supercuts
case, however, was not only illegal but also more easily discoverable
than accounting fraud. The Supercuts scenario involved trading in a
public forum, while accounting fraud consists of actions hidden inside a
company and that would not become visible if the company’s situation
redressed itself in a short period of time. Of course, companies such as
WorldCom are often unable to turn matters around, and massive
disasters occur. Nonetheless, because there is a chance of early redress,
there are strong incentives for the CEO of an ailing company—when
facing the choice of illegal insider trading or illegal accounting fraud—
to opt for the latter. The incentive structure would, however, look
completely different if the insider trading option was legal. In that case,
a CEO could sell her stock based on inside information without the risk
of losing all her money and facing prison time. This would reduce the
incentive to commit accounting fraud and would likely save society
money, jobs, and other assets. This Article proposes the adoption of a
safe harbor within insider trading prohibitions for so-called “fraudinhibiting insider trading,” which would help better align insider trading
laws with the goal of protecting individual investors and the securities
market generally.
III. FRAUD-INHIBITING INSIDER TRADING
Before discussing the criteria for fraud-inhibiting insider trading, it is
helpful to understand the circumstances that can give rise to its use.
When a firm produces earnings that beat the analyst forecast for the
quarter, the stock price rises an average of 5.5%; when earnings fall
below the forecast, the stock price falls an average of 5.04%. 49
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 662.
Jensen, supra note 36, at 7.
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“Generally, the only way for managers to meet those expectations year
in and year out is to cook their numbers to mask the inherent uncertainty
in their businesses.” 50 Once this type of overvaluation happens, a
domino effect can occur that eventually obliterates most or all of a
company’s worth. 51 Many managers will manipulate their accounting
numbers to simply put off bad news that would hurt their stock prices,
and they thus begin a downward spiral that ends in blatant and
potentially enormous accounting fraud. 52 After overvaluations occur,
managers sometimes “realize the markets will hammer [them] unless
[their] company’s performance justifies the stock price,” and after
exploring all value-creating alternatives, they start to take nonfraudulent actions that destroy long-term value but that they “hope will
at least appear to generate the market’s expected performance in the
short run.” 53 In an even worse scenario, managers simply begin
fraudulent activities to support the erroneous valuation of their
corporation. 54
The goal for managers when they realize that their firm is overvalued
is to “postpone the day of reckoning” until they are no longer employed
by their firms or they figure out a way to resolve the problem. 55
Essentially these managers are buying time until they can escape
unharmed or they make the stock worth the amount at which it is
trading. 56 The fraud perpetrated at Enron destroyed approximately $30
billion of the corporation’s real value. 57 The purpose of fraud-inhibiting
insider trading is to put in place a safety valve so that when managers
realize that there is a problem with their firms’ valuations, they do not
find themselves impaled on “Morton’s Fork” 58 when their choices are:
(1) doing nothing and being financially devastated; (2) committing
insider trading and potentially still ending up financially devastated if
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Lambert, supra note 7, at 1091–92.
53. Jensen, supra note 36, at 8–10.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id.
56. Lambert, supra note 7, at 1082.
57. Jensen, supra note 36, at 11 (“[S]enior managers’ efforts to defend the $40 billion of excess
valuation (which was a mistake that was going to go away anyway) effectively destroyed the $30 billion
core value.”).
58. A “Morton’s Fork” is a dilemma where people are faced with equally bad alternatives. What
is Morton’s Fork, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-mortons-fork.htm (last viewed June 17, 2010). The
term comes from Lord Chancellor John Morton, who worked in England under Henry VII. Id.
According to Morton’s logic, wealthy subjects of the Crown obviously had money to be spared for high
taxes, and poor subjects were clearly sitting on savings, so they could also bear paying high taxes. Id.
Rich and poor alike found themselves at the points of “Morton’s Fork” and paying high taxes. Id.
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they get caught, 59 in addition to going to jail; or (3) performing
fraudulent accounting in the hopes that fortuitous circumstances will
somehow prevail and resolve the situation. 60
This Article argues that fraud-inhibiting insider trading would offer a
way out of this dilemma and would increase the wealth of society
without creating further victims. 61 The idea is that an insider would be
allowed to trade on her inside information when certain elements are
satisfied. The first element is that the trading be based on negative
information that will most likely lower the stock price when revealed.
In other words, only price-reducing inside information would be
eligible. The second element is that the trading be done on behalf of an
individual who will himself (or his immediate family) be financially
injured by the reduction in stock value, extending only to the stock he
already owns. The third element required for the fraud-inhibiting insider
trading safe harbor is that the individual have the ability to prevent the
release of the information or to release distorted information to the
public. The goal of the scheme is to avoid harm to society, and if the
individual is not in a position to have an impact on the release of the
information, then there is no global benefit to allowing him to use the
safe harbor to avoid a harm that others will be facing. The final element
is that the person in question must not have committed any fraudulent
activities prior to availing himself of the safe harbor. Since the purpose

59. Insider trading may also result in the loss of any money saved or earned in the process if the
government successfully prosecutes the trader. See Nicholson, supra note 34, at 57 (citations omitted).
60. Another option would be to both commit insider trading and simultaneously accounting
fraud. This is apparently what happened in the case of Joseph Nacchio, the former CEO of Qwest
Communications International. Nacchio was convicted of nineteen counts of insider trading. Dan
Frosch, Qwest’s Nacchio Convicted of Insider Trading, Apr. 18, 2007, available at
www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/technology/20qwest-web.html. The government argued that Nacchio
attempted to avoid detection of his insider transactions, United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1169
(10th Cir. 2008), and also “engaged in a multi-faceted fraudulent scheme designed to mislead the
investing public about the company’s revenue and growth.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Charges Former Qwest CEO Joseph Nacchio and Eight Others with Massive Financial Disclosure
Fraud (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-36.htm. As was the case with Enron and
WorldCom, the fraudulent practices ultimately led to a near-complete destruction of Qwest’s value.
Qwest’s stock value plummeted from a high of $64.50 in March 2000 to a low of $1.11 in August 2002,
a reduction of over 98%. Ken Belson, Ex-Chief of Qwest Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at C1,
available at www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/business/21qwest.html?_r=1. As this Article discusses,
infra, individuals like Nacchio would not be entitled to the fraud-inhibiting insider trading safe harbor if
they participated in fraudulent activities. If this proposal were adopted and Nacchio had simply sold his
shares when faced with a potential loss, he would have saved himself six years of prison time and his
investors hundreds of millions of dollars.
61. It is important to bear in mind that virtually all the potential victims of the decreased stock
value (i.e., the shareholders) would suffer the same or potentially greater loss if the insider trading were
disallowed. From their perspective, fraud-inhibiting insider trading only affects the timing of when their
loss is realized.
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of the safe harbor is to enhance the protection of investors and other
members of society in general, it would be self-defeating if the safe
harbor were applied to those that had already harmed the public.
The fraud-inhibiting insider trading proposal does not affect other
existing insider trading regulations. For example, § 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act would still be applicable, which requires insiders—
officers, directors, or owners of 10% or more of a company’s shares—to
inform the SEC of their securities holdings within ten days after
becoming insiders and report any changes in their holdings within two
business days of transactions both electronically with the SEC and on
the corporation’s website. 62 Furthermore, the prohibitions in § 16 on
“round trip” trading—any two trades occurring within a six-month
period—and prevention of short-selling by insiders 63 would still apply.
Maintaining these provisions is complementary to the purpose of fraudinhibiting insider trading.
IV. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING
To understand the prohibition of insider trading and the different legal
options available in that area, it is important to analyze how the system
came into existence. 64 Insider trading law was not created by wellthought-out (or even poorly-thought-out) statutory drafting. 65 In fact,
insider trading regulations may be the closest thing the United States has
to common-law-created federal criminal law.
A. The Early Days of the Criminalization of Insider Trading
The Supreme Court first ruled on an insider trading case in Strong v.
Repide, where a majority shareholder bought some shares from a
minority shareholder for a price ten times less than they were worth a
few months later. 66 In Repide, the majority shareholder was negotiating
the sale of the company’s sole asset and was the only one who knew that
a very profitable sale was near completion. 67 He also went to great
lengths to ensure the minority shareholder did not find out he was the
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2006).
63. Id. § 78p(b).
64. This Article seeks to present a brief description of the history of insider trading. For a more
extensive review, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 28
(1991).
65. Michael P. Dooley, Comment from an Enforcement Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV
319, 320 (1999).
66. 213 U.S. 419, 422 (1909).
67. Id. at 424.
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one buying her shares. 68 Because the majority shareholder controlled all
the relevant information and purposefully hid his identity when trading,
the Court had little trouble ruling that the majority shareholder had
committed fraud by inducing the minority shareholder to sell her
shares. 69
Since the type of blatant face-to-face fraud that occurred in Repide is
not usually present in insider trading, the SEC needed a legal theory of
insider trading that was not based on such fraud if it wanted to punish
the behavior more broadly. This started with its enforcement action In
the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., a case often said to have marked the
beginning of the modern prohibition on insider trading. 70 In Cady, a
broker received information from the director of a company indicating
that the company had decided to reduce the amount of dividends that it
was going to issue, and the broker then sold shares in the company for
several of his clients before the information was publicly released. 71
The SEC invoked Rule 10b-5 72 to establish liability on the part of the
broker who used this inside information. 73 Rule 10b-5 was enacted
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and prohibits any
“manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.” 74 The goal of the
entire Securities Exchange Act and particularly Rule 10b-5 is “usually
said to be the protection of investors and the maintenance of public
confidence in the securities markets through the imposition of disclosure
requirements and prohibitions of fraud.” 75 Rule 10b-5 does not even
mention insider trading, 76 and it is not likely that Congress thought at
the time that insider trading would be governed by § 10b. 77 In fact,
§ 16, which deals in part with short-swing profits, 78 was originally the
only provision that seemed to discuss insider trading. 79
When “the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act were
68. Id. at 425.
69. Id. at 434.
70. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading,
Investor Harm, and Executive Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 293 (1999).
71. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 907.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
73. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
74. Id. at 910 n.7.
75. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1238 (1995) (citations omitted).
76. Rule 10b-5 states in part that it is unlawful “[t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2010).
77. Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v.
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 160 (1998).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
79. Painter et al., supra note 77, at 161.
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passed, classic insider trading—transactions between uninformed
shareholders and corporate officials possessing inside information—was
not regarded as fraudulent in most jurisdictions. The corporate officials’
duties were considered to run to the corporation as an entity, not to
individual shareholders.” 80 The courts typically viewed insider trading
as a corporate law problem that involved the fiduciary duties of officers
and directors. 81 Section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act was
intended to prevent fraudulent practices when fulfilling these duties. 82
The SEC took the opportunity in Cady to establish the obligation of
insiders to disclose the information in their possession to the public or to
refrain from trading the stocks concerned. 83 Even though there does not
appear to be any actual breach of the insider’s duty in Cady, the SEC
determined that it was appropriate to sanction the tippee that used the
information. 84 The SEC premised its decision in this administrative
action upon the “need of regulation for the protection of investors.” 85
The rule was announced as a form of “disclose or abstain,” meaning that
the insider had to either disclose his information or abstain from
trading. 86 As many scholars have pointed out, however, disclosing is
rarely an option due to other fiduciary duties to which the insider is
often subject, so the default rule in reality amounts to just abstaining. 87
Cady was an administrative case that commentators at the time did
not expect to result in a new rule or law, but it may precisely have been
the SEC’s intention to use this administrative case to establish a new
rule regarding insider trading without public comment or congressional
awareness at that early stage. 88 The SEC had strong motivation to
include insider trading within its jurisdiction, namely to increase its
prestige, power, and budget. 89 No matter what the SEC’s original intent
was, the rule in Cady turned out to have a lasting effect.
Seven years later, the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Texas Gulf

80. Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353,
361 (1988) (citations omitted).
81. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1590.
82. William R. McLucas et al., Settlement of Insider Trading Cases with the SEC, 48 BUS. LAW.
79, 81 (1993) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980)).
83. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 911 (1961).
84. Id. at 909 (stating that the information was given under the mistaken belief that it was already
publicly available).
85. Id. at 910.
86. Id. at 911.
87. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 45, 67 (2007).
88. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did Not Bark,
31 J. CORP. L. 167, 181 n.55 (2005).
89. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1597.
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Sulphur. 90
The case named as defendants several upper-level
management and research employees of a company because they used
inside information to buy stocks and options. 91 The company had
discovered mineral deposits in Canada that were going to be extremely
valuable when the company mined them. 92 The defendants were aware
of this discovery well before the public and purchased stock in the
company for prices as low as $17.75 a share, whereas shares increased
in value to $58.25 after the information was released. 93 The Second
Circuit held that the defendants had violated Rule 10b-5 when they
participated in insider trading. 94 The court acknowledged that the
intention of the Securities and Exchange Act, and therefore of Rule 10b5, “is the protection of investors against fraud.” 95 The court interpreted
this protection as mandating that all investors should have equal access
to information and that trading on information unavailable to the general
public should be prohibited. 96 Therefore, the court imposed the same
rule of “disclose or abstain” as in Cady 97 because “[i]t was the intent of
Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to
identical market risks.” 98 The court further specified that “[b]efore
insiders may act upon material information, such information must have
been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to ensure its availability
to the investing public.” 99 In this early major federal case, the court
suggested a parity of information approach that could have criminalized
all trades where there was any material information disparity. 100 This
approach was, however, unlikely to last long if for no other reason than
the fact that “[i]nequality among investors is a basic reality of the market
place.” 101 For example, an ordinary day trader cannot call and talk to
the CFO of a corporation the way that a major analyst could, and staff
support and research capabilities vary widely among different
investors. 102

90. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
91. Id. at 843.
92. Id. at 843–46.
93. Id. at 839 n.2, 847.
94. Id. at 864.
95. Id. at 861.
96. Id. at 848.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 852.
99. Id. at 854.
100. Thompson, supra note 70, at 293.
101. James P. Jalil, Proposals for Insider Trading Regulation After the Fall of the House of
Enron, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 689, 690 (2003).
102. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
F-WAGNER

988

8/3/2011 10:11:48 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

B. From the Parity of Information Requirement to Fraud and Deceit
Theories
The second wave of modern insider trading law was ushered in by
Chiarella v. United States 103 and rejected the parity of information
requirement, instead focusing on the fraudulent behavior of the inside
trader and on tort concepts concerning deceit. 104 In Chiarella, the case
surrounded a defendant who was employed at a financial printing
company. 105 He was able to discern from the documents on which he
was working the identities of companies that were subject to a pending
acquisition or merger. 106 He used this information to buy shares in the
companies before the information became public and their share prices
went up, at which point he sold his shares for an easy profit. 107 The
Supreme Court overturned his conviction, explaining that a Rule 10b-5
conviction must be based upon fraud and that his silence and subsequent
trading could only be fraudulent if he had a duty to speak, which was not
present in this case. 108 The Court also refused to entertain the argument
that the fraud could be based on the defendant’s “misappropriation” of
information from his employer because, the Court reasoned, that theory
was not presented to the jury. 109 After Chiarella, in an apparent attempt
to avoid some of the requirements imposed by the Court, the SEC
adopted Rule 14e-3, which addresses situations dealing with tender
offers and imposes the “disclose or abstain” requirement (regardless of
the existence of any fiduciary duty) that had just been rejected by the
Supreme Court, 110 but which limits itself to the context of tender offers,
thereby partially working around the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Three years later, in Dirks v. SEC, 111 the Court recognized the idea of
information as a commodity. 112
This concept has led several
commentators and jurists to conclude that the regulation of insider
trading is properly based on a property rights justification. 113 In Dirks,
the defendant, a securities analyst, received information from an insider

103. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
104. Thompson, supra note 70, at 294.
105. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
106. Id. at 224.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 235.
109. Id. at 236–37.
110. Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119, 126–27 (2002).
111. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
112. Thompson, supra note 70, at 294.
113. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309.
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that a company was involved in massive fraud. 114 The Wall Street
Journal and the SEC had been repeatedly notified about this fraudulent
activity, with no response. 115 The analyst informed his clients, who in
turn sold their shares in this company, which ultimately led to an
investigation and public disclosure of the fraudulent practices. 116 Rather
than thanking the defendant for bringing this fraud to light and ending a
practice that could have destroyed investors’ lives, the SEC investigated
and sanctioned the defendant for violating Rule 10b-5. 117 The Supreme
Court reversed that decision. 118 The Court held that any liability for the
defendant (the tippee) must be premised on liability attaching to the
insider (the tipper) and that liability must be based on the breach of a
duty that the tipper owes. 119 Furthermore, whether there has been a
breach of duty depends in part upon the purpose of the disclosure—if the
disclosure was not based upon some benefit to the tipper, then there is
no breach of duty. 120 The tipper in Dirks was motivated by a desire to
expose fraud, he did not gain by his disclosure, and hence he did not
breach his fiduciary duty; consequently, neither did the defendant breach
any duty. 121
The Court reiterated the requirements that it had previously used in
Chiarella and that were inspired from Cady—i.e., that there had to be:
“(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the
unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure.” 122 Recognizing a property
right in this kind of information would have enabled the company to
prolong its illegal activities. Thus, because the company had no
legitimate property interest in the nonpublic corporate information
concerning its internal fraud, the insider did not wrongfully breach a
fiduciary duty to the company by tipping off the defendant, and the
defendant in turn breached no duty when using the information.123
Dirks could be interpreted as standing for the proposition that not only
are property rights involved in insider trading situations, but that a
breach of duty is necessary as well. Chiarella and Dirks were quickly
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
Id. at 649–50.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 653–54 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1990)).
MACEY, supra note 64, at 57–58 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–67).
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followed by the adoption of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988. 124 While these laws established Congress’s approval of insider
trading prosecutions, the laws did not clarify exactly what should be
prosecuted or why.
C. The Current State of Insider Trading Doctrine
The third wave in modern Supreme Court insider trading
jurisprudence came with United States v. O’Hagan, 125 where the Court
moved away from the tort-driven theory in Chiarella and closer toward
a theory based on agency law and restitution. 126 O’Hagan dealt with a
defendant who was a partner in the Minneapolis law firm of Dorsey and
Whitney. 127 Dorsey and Whitney had been hired by its client Grand Met
to work on the latter’s intended acquisition of the Pillsbury Company. 128
The defendant became aware of the planned acquisition through his
employment and bought large quantities of Pillsbury common stock and
purchase options. 129 When the acquisition plan was publicly revealed,
the price of Pillsbury stock increased, and the defendant sold his stock
and options for a profit of $4.3 million. 130
The defendant was convicted of violating Rule 10b-5 based upon the
“misappropriation theory” that holds an individual liable under Rule
10b-5 when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information. 131 The misappropriation theory establishes liability for
those who could be classified as “outsiders” that nonetheless have access
to information that makes them liable for “insider trading.” 132 In
justifying the misappropriation theory, the Court 133 referred to the
124. Id. at 1.
125. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
126. Thompson, supra note 70, at 296.
127. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 648.
131. Id. at 652.
132. Id. at 653.
133. An ironic circumstance that dramatically changed the application of insider trading
regulation concerned Justice Powell. Justice Powell did not think that the misappropriation theory was
correct, and when another insider trading case, Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), was
originally denied certiorari, he wrote a dissent from the denial that apparently changed enough of the
Justices’ minds that they granted certiorari after all. Justice Powell then retired before the case was
heard, and the Justices divided evenly on the misappropriation question, thereby leaving it open until the
O’Hagan Court decided that the theory should indeed apply. A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan:
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“animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence.” 134 The Court relied
on the damage to investor confidence and resulting reduction in
investment as well as the general impact on market participation to
buttress its application of the misappropriation theory. 135 The O’Hagan
decision began with an acknowledgement that “confidential information
[belonging to a corporation] qualifies as property.” 136 It also stated that
trading on misappropriated information harms investors in addition to
deceiving the information provider. 137 Therefore, the O’Hagan Court
both supported the idea that insider trading is based on property
principles and endorsed the theory that prohibitions against the practice
seek to protect the investor.
A few years after the O’Hagan decision and in the wake of several
financial scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX)138
in an attempt to prevent future economic turmoil. SOX included a
provision that required insiders to report trades within two days after
they took place. 139
Sarbanes–Oxley’s goals include improving accounting oversight,
strengthening auditor independence, requiring more transparency in
corporate financial matters, eliminating analyst conflicts of interest, and
requiring greater accountability from corporate officials. 140

SOX also increased the possible penalties for insider trading to twentyfive years in prison and a $5 million fine for individuals 141 and contains
a section authorizing a prison term of up to twenty-five years for
knowing or attempted execution of “a scheme or artifice to defraud any
person” in relation to a security of a registered or reporting company. 142
Further, SOX instituted requirements for CEOs and CFOs to personally
certify the accuracy of their periodic reports. 143 Yet, as a former SEC
official pointed out, the increased penalties may have no effect because
Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 16 (1998).
134. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
135. Id. at 658–59.
136. Id. at 654.
137. Id. at 656.
138. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
139. Jalil, supra note 101, at 702.
140. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes–Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 359 (2003) (citations omitted).
141. Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing
Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 948 (2003) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 948 (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 951.
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if executives are “willing to risk five years, they’re going to risk [ten]
The motives behind SOX—to “protect investors by
years.” 144
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures,” 145 —
were generally commendable, but the statute was passed in haste, partly
due to political expediency. Furthermore, SOX primarily addressed how
corporate fraud was conducted when it increased both the penalties
imposed and the SEC’s resources, 146 but it did little to change some of
the incentives that led individuals like Bernard Ebbers to commit the
frauds in the first place. While the arguments in this Article mainly
focus on maximizing utility and efficiency, the next Part provides a brief
sketch of all three major philosophical rationales used to justify a
prohibition on insider trading. 147
V. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
A. Fairness and Deontological Arguments
Insider trading has been attacked and defended for over four decades
based on several philosophical theories. 148 According to at least one
former SEC Chairman, insider trading is not only “legally forbidden[,]
[i]t’s is [also] morally wrong . . . [a]nd . . . economically dangerous.” 149
To determine if it is “morally wrong,” it is helpful to look at insider
trading from several different perspectives. The first position that this
Article will address is the claim that it is simply “unfair” 150 per se. As
previous authors have pointed out, the concept of “fairness” is often
vague and unhelpful, 151 with little or no explanation as to what “fair” is
or why insider trading is “unfair.” 152 At least one scholar contends that
this “fairness” or equal access approach “collapses into [an analysis] of
144. Id. at 955 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 952.
146. Sarbanes–Oxley effectuated a 77% increase in the SEC’s budget and authorized the use of
funds to hire an additional 200 professionals for the agency. Brickey, supra note 37, at 244.
147. A more intensive examination of the philosophical underpinnings of insider trading is outside
the scope of this Article, so Part V only seeks to provide a basic overview.
148. Henry Manne has argued for over forty years that insider trading does not harm long-term
investors, that it is an appropriate compensation mechanism, and that it contributes to the efficiency of
stock-market pricing. Manne, supra note 88, at 168.
149. Charles Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Question of Integrity: Promoting
Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading, Remarks at the S.E.C. Speaks Conference (Feb. 27,
1998), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt.
150. As some scholars have noted, “if fairness is defined with reference to shareholders’ welfare,
it is impossible to sustain the argument that insider trading is unfair, since the activity benefits the very
group it is supposed to harm.” MACEY, supra note 64, at 28.
151. Lee, supra note 110, at 121–22.
152. MACEY, supra note 64, at 23.
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property rights when subjected to rigorous analysis.” 153 In a rare
attempt to define the term in the context of insider trading, one author
describes fairness “as a brake upon self-interest. It is the normative
basis for a variety of social conventions that prevent individuals from
doing that which would otherwise be in their own respective interest.” 154
This concept of fairness is based on “the deontological view that what
makes an act morally justifiable is the respect it expresses for the
autonomy, rights and dignity of those persons affected by it” 155 and “not
merely the social welfare or the utility that the act produces.” 156 The
argument in relation to insider trading is that taking advantage of one’s
position in a case of information asymmetry means disrespecting the
autonomy of the other actor 157 because information is central to rational
deliberation, and therefore precluding this deliberation is violative of
autonomy. 158 From this deontological viewpoint, “human choice is a
source of value, and so long as a person competently makes choices in a
manner that does not wrong others, morality requires that one refrain
from interfering with these choices.” 159 In other words, precluding
deliberation would be one such form of immoral interference.
Furthermore, deontological theory maintains that benefits to society, to
the interfering individuals, or even to the individuals against whom the
interference took place cannot correct the harm caused by this
interference with autonomous choices. 160
There are multiple responses to this possible deontological objection
to insider trading. The first takes issue with the idea that fairness must
inherently operate as a “brake upon self-interest.” Specifically, this
position makes the assumption that self-interest and others’ interests are
necessarily in conflict. If A’s interests and B’s interests are aligned,
then of course there would be no need for this “brake” to be imposed
upon A’s interests, and in fact, it could be argued that it would be
“unfair” by our intuitive understanding of the term to have such a brake.
Similarly, if social welfare or utility are aligned with autonomy and
dignity, there is no need for a braking mechanism. Finally, it cannot be
that for a situation to be “fair,” everyone must possess the exact same
informational basis. Even if one acknowledges that equal access to
153. Id. at 24.
154. Lee, supra note 110, at 141.
155. Id. at 141 n.70 (citation omitted).
156. Allan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principles in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 375, 381 (1999).
157. Lee, supra note 110, at 150.
158. Id. at 151.
159. Strudler & Orts, supra note 156, at 409.
160. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
F-WAGNER

994

8/3/2011 10:11:48 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

information is not the same as equal information, 161 a categorical ban on
transactions involving disparities of information (or access to
information) would be untenable and undesirable in many common
interactions. Given the fact that most people would not classify all such
situations as immoral in all their possible permutations, it is likely that
further factors are necessary for the “unfair” or “immoral”
characterization than simply the existence of inequality. To give an
example, when buying a product, the consumer virtually never knows all
the information about the product that the manufacturer does, even when
the manufacturer has not purposefully concealed any data. Yet, one
would not say that the buyer’s autonomy was violated as a result when
she engages in the transaction. An information asymmetry is thus at
best necessary, but definitely not sufficient to establish a loss of
autonomy.
In sum, the following would have to be true in every insider trading
situation for this kind of trading to be inherently unfair under such a
deontological understanding: (1) self-interest and others’ interests are
never aligned in an insider trading situation; and (2) autonomous
decision-making is necessarily violated in a way that goes above and
beyond the many unproblematic daily situations of information
asymmetry that even deontological theory would likely deem unfair,
such as buying a product without complete information. 162 It is hard to
see how all of these are true of every given instance of insider trading,
and the deontological theory thus does not appear to suffice to prohibit
every such instance.
Even assuming that insider trading is unfair in a meaningful way, this
may in fact be mitigated by the way that corporations respond to the
practice. For instance, a recent article suggests that companies adjust
executive compensation based on the liberality of their own insider
trading policies and give lower compensation where insiders have
greater freedom to trade. 163 The article examines executives’ ability to
trade under so-called “Rule 10b5-1 trading plans,” which allow
executives to set up preplanned trades that can be cancelled before they
take place, and argues that these plans have at times been manipulated to
161. Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 125 (1993).
162. Additionally, some have argued that under deontological theories, it is inappropriate to
penalize someone for an act if no one was harmed by the act. Strudler & Orts, supra note 156, at 387.
If one adds this criterion, a third requirement would be that someone gets harmed in a measurable way
every time insider trading occurs.
163. M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay 10 (Univ. of Chicago Law & Economics,
Olin Working Paper No. 521, 2010) (quotation omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1605170.
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incorporate inside information into trading. 164 Research conducted into
the ability of corporate boards to take such “informed trading” into
account when setting CEO compensation packages indicates that when
this kind of trading is not contractually restricted by corporations, CEO
compensation is lower by an average of 20%. 165 This suggests that
where CEOs are able to use a loophole to practice some limited forms of
insider trading, the corporation is better off overall because it can pay
them lower salaries. “At least with respect to classic insider trading if
boards are taking potential trading profits into consideration when
setting pay, it is difficult to locate potential victims of the trade.” 166
Furthermore, “[i]f traders know about the potential for informed traders
to be on the other side of a transaction, this risk should be priced by the
market, and the firm should internalize these costs.” 167 These types of
factors should at least reduce the concerns about the potential inherent
unfairness of insider trading.
B. Contractarian Arguments
A second philosophical lens through which to look at insider trading
would be a contractarian framework. This framework examines what
preferences individuals would express if they were asked to give their
opinions about a potential set of rules, assuming that they did not know
their position in life in advance and there were no forms of coercion. 168
A key component of modern contractarian thought is the protection for
the disadvantaged that is achieved by asking people “before they know
what situations they will be in . . . to imagine the worst that could
happen to them under alternative rules and to choose the rules that
would avoid intolerable outcomes.” 169
Some commentators believe that the contractarian position would find
insider trading unacceptable because “[p]eople would not agree to be
part of a system where their disadvantage in access to knowledge could
be turned into disadvantages in the distribution of other resources.” 170
This is, however, arguable. Typically, “[i]ndividuals want to be able to
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id. at 24.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id. at 33. Even if the corporation should suffer a slight reduction in the value of its securities
and thus a decline in the overall value of the firm, this reduction is compensated by the mentioned
lowered CEO salaries. Id.
168. Scheppele, supra note 161, at 152. The most famous formulation of this theory is John
Rawls’s “veil of ignorance.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
169. Scheppele, supra note 161, at 154–55.
170. Id. at 162.
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take chances, as long as they are protected from catastrophe.” 171 Some
forms of insider trading satisfy this desire by allowing people to take
chances in the stock market and help to protect them from the type of
disastrous consequences that occurred to the WorldCom investors.
Furthermore, because “people feel that losses from the status quo are
much worse than losses from an imaginary ideal state, economic
arguments notwithstanding, opportunity costs are not as important in
estimating well-being as are costs of losses from one’s current
position.” 172 This being the case, if asked beforehand if they prefer to
allow an insider to gain, without the possibility of gain on their own
part, or if they would rather possibly lose what they consider to be
theirs, most people will presumably choose the former. That is the
trade-off presented by some types of insider trading—i.e., the loss that
individuals could (and almost certainly will) suffer if fraud is perpetrated
under the current regime versus these individuals’ drastically reduced
loss if some forms of insider trading are allowed. 173 Because the latter
option presents many benefits under the ex ante perspective of
contractarian theory, it is unclear why the theory should strictly prohibit
insider trading. 174
C. Utilitarian Arguments
While there is some merit to viewing insider trading through the
previously mentioned philosophical theories, they do not illuminate the
issue as well as a third framework—the utilitarian lens. Utilitarianism, a
theory usually credited to Jeremy Bentham, 175 provides a number of
171. Id. at 156.
172. Id. at 164 (citation omitted).
173. Furthermore, if the studies are correct that show how greater freedom for executives to
engage in informed trading lowers executive compensation and ultimately benefits the firm, many
investors would likely prefer a scenario of liberalized insider trading. See supra text accompanying
notes 163–167.
174. One possible problem with the contractarian accepting insider trading could be seen in the
“ultimatum game.” In this experiment, two individuals are told that they have to split-up money; the
first individual is told to propose a division and the second can either accept the division or refuse to
deal altogether. The idea is that the first would propose a division largely in favor of himself while
thinking that the second individual can either accept the deal and be better off than with nothing or reject
the deal and in fact end up with nothing. Yet, when the game was run as an experiment, neither of these
two predictions really came true. The first individual actually often offered relatively equal rewards,
and the second often rejected a share of 20% or less. Thompson, supra note 70, at 301. The outcome of
the second prediction might suggest that people will sometimes prefer both actors to be worse off than
for them to have a lower reward themselves. This is not entirely compelling if applied to insider trading,
however, because the stakes contemplated in reality are considerably higher in both the positive and
negative direction than those presented in the experiment.
175. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
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tools that allow one to calculate the costs and benefits of insider trading
and, at the very least, approach some conclusions regarding its effects in
economic terms. All crimes impose economic and other costs on
society, and it is in great part to reduce these costs that society crafts
laws and regulations that provide punishments as disincentives to
commit crimes. 176 Would-be criminals themselves weigh the pros and
cons of performing potentially criminal actions, 177 and thus, the law tries
to carefully shape the rules such that these individuals take socially
optimal actions—actions that will neither be so overly risk-averse as to
prevent innovation and various forms of creative endeavors nor so
daring that the community is harmed. Furthermore, utilitarianism is
useful in this context because “[t]he general purpose of legal rules is to
ensure that society’s resources are allocated responsibly.”178 The
utilitarian position basically dictates an evaluation of the good, which
can be labeled as “happiness,” “wealth,” or “utility,” that a particular
decision will bring about against the good that an alternative decision
would create. 179 Thus, the decision that will result in the greatest
amount of good is the correct decision. In the context of insider trading,
this means that those forms of insider trading should be allowed that
increase society’s overall wealth, regardless if that means increasing its
gains or decreasing its losses as much as possible.
The criminal law operates under the theory of general deterrence, the
idea being that if the system punishes individuals who break the law,
other would-be criminals will refrain from doing so because they do not
want to suffer the same fate. 180 An individual “will choose the course of
action that will maximize his personal expected utility,” 181 and
therefore, “[e]ffective outcomes from this cost–benefit assessment
require the risk of detection and apprehension, or the severity of
punishment [to] be greater than any purported benefit to be gained from
the prospective illegal act.” 182 In particular, when we are discussing
something as closely connected to finance as trading on the stock
market, it makes intuitive sense to use a philosophical system that easily
translates into an implementable set of rules. Many of the arguments
against regulating insider trading can be attributed to the University of
(1789).
176. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968) (applying utilitarian theory to the criminal law).
177. Moohr, supra note 141, at 956.
178. MACEY, supra note 64, at 2.
179. Scheppele, supra note 161, at 150.
180. Nicholson, supra note 34, at 51–52.
181. Id. at 52 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
182. Id. (citation omitted).
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Chicago’s Law and Economics school of thought, which essentially
proposes a cost–benefit analysis derived from the utilitarian position.183
An evaluation under this method usually concludes with the proposition
that an “an absolute ban [on insider trading] is pointless much of the
time and welfare-reducing the rest of the time.” 184 This Article will
evaluate many of the specific claims about the possible benefits and
detriments of insider trading under utilitarianism and show why
utilitarianism would endorse the legalization of fraud-inhibiting insider
trading. Specifically, the next Part will show that, from a utilitarian
perspective, allowing fraud-inhibiting insider trading makes sense both
if one’s main concern is the effect of insider trading on investor
confidence in the market and if one judges fraud-inhibiting insider
trading under a property rights paradigm.
VI. THE MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSIDER TRADING
From a utilitarian standpoint, insider trading should be prohibited if
the costs of insider trading outweigh its benefits. 185 There are several
arguments that have been made against insider trading, but two are by
far the most prominent attacks. The first objection is based on the idea
that insider trading affects the confidence of investors and in turn the
types of investments they make. The second objection is related to the
idea that insider trading is a form of theft because it violates a property
interest in information.
A. The Confidence Argument
One of the most often cited reasons (though not usually by
economists) for the prohibition of insider trading is the loss of
confidence in the market and the subsequent desertion of the market by
investors if they believe that there are unfair informational advantages at
play. 186 This argument is based on the idea that, regardless of whether
insider trading is harmful, people believe that it is and therefore will not
trade if they think such trading is allowed. 187 The claim is made by
proponents of insider trading prohibitions, by government agencies, and

183. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 176. See also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (explaining how various criminal law doctrines can
promote economic efficiency).
184. Lee, supra note 110, at 139.
185. Lambert, supra note 7, at 1057.
186. Cox & Fogarty, supra note 80, at 353, 354.
187. Lee, supra note 110, at 138.
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occasionally by the courts. They assert that insider trading “impairs
investor confidence, thereby discouraging capital formation and
reducing liquidity.” 188 The SEC usually argues that insider trading is
unfair and reduces public confidence in the securities markets. 189 A
former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, stated in relation to insider trading
that “if there is a perception of unfairness, there’ll be no investor
confidence—and precious little investment.” 190 In fact, in the most
recent insider trading Supreme Court case, United States v. O’Hagan,
“there is no mention of individual harm in specific transactions. Rather,
the focus is on the harm from a decrease in public confidence in the
market.” 191 A similar objection is that if insider trading is allowed,
insiders will always have the advantage over outsiders and will therefore
make better deals, which will in turn both reduce liquidity in the market
and make outsiders suffer increased transaction costs associated with all
trading. 192 Proponents of insider trading regulation have suggested that
“banning insider trading, however, by increasing the confidence of
uninformed investors may lower the premium they require to transact
and in turn lead to more stable and liquid markets.” 193
There are multiple responses to these arguments. One problem with
the claim that insider trading must be prohibited to “protect the integrity
of the nation’s capital markets” and that unless investors think they are
playing on a “level playing field” they will lose confidence and stop
investing 194 is the fact that if insider trading continues to be banned, this
does not “level the playing field” but rather tilts it toward investment
professionals. 195 “[I]f insiders are banned from trading, outsiders will
not automatically profit. Rather, market professionals, who are the nextbest information processors after insiders, will simply increase their
profits.” 196 It is arguably due to this fact that there is strong support in
the investment professional community for prohibiting insider
trading. 197
188. Pritchard, supra note 133, at 48.
189. Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions
Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory of Inside Information Is Untenable, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 149, 150 (1993) (citations omitted).
190. Levitt, supra note 149, at 2.
191. Thompson, supra note 70, at 299.
192. Pritchard, supra note 133, at 49–50. See also Lee, supra note 110, at 165.
193. Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, The Insider Trading Debate, 82 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA
ECON. REV. 34, 40 (1997).
194. MACEY, supra note 64, at 41 (internal citations omitted).
195. Id. at 42.
196. Id. at 14. See also David D. Haddock & Jonathan Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987).
197. MACEY, supra note 64, at 17. See also Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1604.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

27

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
F-WAGNER

1000

8/3/2011 10:11:48 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Furthermore, the position that insider trading will increase transaction
costs again focuses on all types of insider trading taken together. Even
assuming that, generally speaking, insider trading will result in better
deals for the insider and higher costs for the outside trader, this
argument is inaccurate when considering fraud-inhibiting insider
trading. In the model that this Article presents, insider trading would
only be authorized when an insider uses negative information that, butfor the trading, may have remained undisclosed for a longer period of
time or may have been released in a distorted form. Under these
conditions, insider trading may prevent potentially significant losses to
both major and individual investors. This loss prevention would work
as a safety valve, releasing pressure and reducing the transaction costs
because of the lowered risk of corporate fraud and its consequences.
Such a safety valve could increase confidence in other contexts as
well. For example, when questioned during a congressional inquiry into
the recent financial crisis, a Bear Stearns executive stated that rumors
caused a significant decline in his company’s liquidity and that “[t]he
market’s loss of confidence, even though it was unjustified and
irrational, became a self-fulfilling prophecy.” 198 If fraud-inhibiting
insider trading was in place to allow executives to get out, it would serve
to reduce speculation and therefore increase investor confidence. Also,
if investors knew that highly placed CEOs could get out if bad news was
on the way and that investors would be informed if that occurred, they
would be less inclined to speculate about pending disasters as long as
they saw that the executives were not selling their stock.
Not only is it possible that fraud-inhibiting insider trading could
increase confidence in the stock market, but as multiple commentators
have pointed out, “the public has never shown any signs of losing
confidence in the stock market because of the existence of insider
trading.” 199 The SEC’s position that insider trading results in a loss of
confidence by investors has little empirical backing and has been
criticized by Henry Manne—one of the most ardent supporters of legal
insider trading—as a “nearly unfalsifiable proposition.” 200 Yet, there
are actually several different empirical measures that can be used to cast
doubts on this theory. First, the theory is difficult to defend in light of
the fact that during the 1980s, a very notorious incident of insider

198. Bear Stearns Brought Down by ‘Rumors’: Ex-CEO, BREITBART, May 5, 2010,
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.489ada6bb3c70a089e9ce555a6d00cf4.01&show_article=
1.
199. Thompson, supra note 70, at 300 (quoting Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 577 (1970)).
200. Manne, supra note 88, at 168 n.5.
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trading was followed by one of the most robust periods in the stock
market. 201 In April of 1985, Businessweek ran a headline reading “The
Epidemic of Insider Trading: The SEC is Fighting a Losing Battle to
Halt Stock Market Abuses.” 202 The insider trading scandals of the
1980s were some of the most sensational events in the popular business
press of the time. 203 One of the most publicized cases was that of Ivan
Boesky 204 and Michael Milken. 205 Since the Boesky scandal—in which
several individuals used insider trading information to earn large sums
of money 206 —was such a well-known event, one can use its aftermath as
an imperfect but interesting indicator to determine how insider trading
affects the confidence and investments of existing and potential
investors. Right before Boesky’s actions became public, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (Dow) was at 1873.59; a week later, it was up to
1893.56; a month later, it was up to 1922.81; after six months it was at
2325.49. 207 Therefore, even though the most widespread insider trading
scandal in the history of Wall Street had just been revealed and was still
being reported on, the stock market value increased by almost 25%.
While this does not provide any sort of ultimate proof, it makes the
theory that insider trading events have large and damaging effects on the
market less plausible.
At the same time, one should go further than just looking at the value
of the stock market over that period of time because it is possible that
investor confidence could have been affected, and hence investments
may have gone down while the overall value of the Dow misleadingly
still rose. This could, for instance, have occurred if a few large
companies had substantial success during that period, causing their stock
price to go up even though confidence and the quantity of investments
were down. One can decrease the possibility of reaching an erroneous
conclusion on this subject by also checking the volume (the number of
trades with no reference to the value of the stocks) during the specific
time frame. If one looks at the volume of stocks traded on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), there seems to be little evidence that
insider trading led to a loss in investor confidence. In 1987, the year
following the revelation and publicizing of Ivan Boesky’s insider trading

201. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87. See also Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 1243.
202. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 273 (1991).
203. Hu & Noe, supra note 193, at 34.
204. Ivan Boesky was the inspiration for the blockbuster film Wall Street by Oliver Stone,
released in the late 1980s. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1987).
205. Hu & Noe, supra note 193, at 34.
206. For a detailed discussion of the Boesky scandal, see STEWART, supra note 202.
207. Cox & Fogarty, supra note 80, at 354 n.5.
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activities, there was an increase of approximately 34% in the volume of
stock traded on the NYSE. 208 In fact, over a twenty-eight year
timeframe, namely from 1980 to 2008, the volume of trading on the
NYSE only went down at two points in time, as can be seen in Figure 1
below. 209 The first period was from 1988 to 1990 (with slight
improvement in between), and the second period started around 2003.
Both of these periods were preceded by calamitous events in the stock
market. The late 1980’s reduction in trading followed what has been
termed “Black Monday,” when the stock market lost more than 20% of
its value in a single day, 210 and the reduction in 2003 came after the
Enron and WorldCom financial meltdowns that resulted in two of the
largest bankruptcies in American history as well as the loss of billions of
dollars of value in the stock market and of thousands of jobs.
Figure 1 211
Volume Traded [in Units Traded]

Year

208. For the numbers used to put together this graph, see U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Statistical
Abstract, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/banking_finance_insurance.html
(last visited June 16, 2010). Some may posit that while there was an increase in volume, perhaps the
scandal made it a more modest increase compared to those in previous years. The data does not
corroborate this hypothesis; the increases that preceded the 1986–1987 one, beginning with the 1980–
1981 interval, were 4%, 38%, 31%, 7%, and 19%, respectively. See id. The 34% increase is thus, if
anything, one of the stronger increases in that era.
209. Id.
210. Investopedia, Black Monday, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blackmonday.asp (last
visited June 27, 2010). It should be noted that while there is still disagreement about what caused the
crash in 1987, there is virtually no suggestion that insider trading was the cause. Cox and Fogarty,
supra note 80, at 354.
211. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 208.
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These statistics potentially suggest that insider trading may not have a
substantial impact on the amount of trading that occurs, but only
indirectly gets at the question of whether there is a loss of confidence in
the market or in business generally.
To get more direct evidence concerning this possible loss of
confidence, one can look at the data collected in the General Social
Survey (GSS). The GSS is a survey that has been conducted
periodically by the University of Chicago since 1972. 212 It includes two
pertinent questions concerning Americans’ confidence in the stock
market and business in general. The first question is: “I am going to
name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running
these institutions are concerned, would you say you have (1) a great deal
of confidence, (2) only some confidence, or (3) hardly any confidence at
all in them?” 213 The interviewer then names several institutions,
including “major companies” and “banks and other financial
institutions.” 214 Hence, a lower number on this scale represents a higher
level of confidence. There are two periods of time covered by the GSS
that provide important information for an inquiry into whether insider
trading as opposed to accounting fraud is likely to lower confidence in
the market. The first significant time period is that immediately
following the Ivan Boesky insider trading scandal, specifically 1986 and
1987. During this period, the GSS was conducted in February through
April of each year. 215 In the 1986 survey, the average response when
asked how much confidence a person had in banks and financial
institutions was 1.96; one year later, after the news of Ivan Boesky had
been extensively reported on, including a cover story in Time Magazine
in December of 1986, 216 the level of confidence was reported at 1.86.217
Therefore, after the incident, confidence rose, and people on average felt
more confident than they had in the time period before they were aware
of the insider trading scandal. Another important time to consider is
2002, just after the Enron and later WorldCom accounting fraud
212. For general information about the GSS, see The Nat’l Data Program for the Sciences
(NORC) at the Univ. of Chicago, GSS General Social Survey, http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/ (last
visited June 13, 2010).
213. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR. UNIV. OF CHICAGO, GSS AMERICA’S SOCIAL SURVEY 21
(1987), available at http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/Documents/QUEX/1987/1987%20GSS.pdf.
214. Id.
215. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR. UNIV. OF CHICAGO, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972–
2008: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 7 (2009), available at http://www.norc.org/NR/rdonlyres/21C53AAC1267-43B6-A915-A38857DC9D63/1645/50000INTRO.pdf.
216. Going After the Crooks, TIME, Dec. 1, 1986, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,962963,00.html.
217. See Univ. of California, Berkeley, Survey Documentation and Analysis,
http://sda.berkeley.edu/cgi-bin/hsda?harcsda+gss08 (last visited June 13, 2010).
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scandals broke. At that point, the confidence in banks and financial
institutions went from 1.84 in 2000 to 1.95 in 2002.218 It makes
intuitive sense that people would lose confidence after the Enron and
WorldCom events given that dishonest dealings cost a lot of people their
money and jobs, which was not the case with Boesky’s and Milken’s
activities.
The second useful question for the analysis here relates to people’s
level of confidence in major business. In early 1986, before most people
were aware of the massive insider trading that was taking place
surrounding Boesky and Milken, this figure was 1.84, and in 1987, after
the news broke, it was 1.77. 219 Therefore, people’s level of confidence
again rose after the scandal. Furthermore, in 2000, before the
accounting fraud scandals, this confidence level was 1.81, and in 2002,
it was 1.99. 220 Hence, people’s confidence in major business dropped
after the Enron and WorldCom scandals along with their confidence in
banks and financial institutions, but their confidence, if anything,
slightly rose after the insider trading events.
The various data suggests that Enron and subsequent accounting fraud
scandals inflicted not only huge financial losses but also caused a
reduction in public confidence in the securities market. 221 Relatedly,
Enron, WorldCom, and some smaller similar scandals had a very
significant amount of press coverage. 222 In the ten weeks following the
earnings report that showed the fraud, there were over 250 stories about
Enron in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal alone. 223 The
press coverage did not quickly die down: from the time that the scandals
broke to the time of the guilty verdicts for Enron executives Ken Lay
and Jeffrey Skilling over four years later, there were more than 780
stories in just the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. 224 Even
more appeared in some local papers; for example, the Houston
Chronicle had nearly 2,000 different Enron stories. 225 This suggests the
possibility that what truly causes a loss of confidence in the nation’s
financial markets is corporate fraud. 226 When these types of activities
218. Id. During those years, the survey was given biennially..
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See also Kathleen F. Brickey, In Enron’s Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 397 (2006).
222. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Boardroom to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media and the
Corporate Governance Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L. 625, 625 (2008).
223. Id. at 627.
224. Id. at 655.
225. Id.
226. Brickey, supra note 37, at 222.
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occur, the consequences are often long-lasting in both economic terms
and in the amount of attention that is paid to them. Therefore, and based
on the limited empirical data available and presented here, a
commentator’s statement in reference to insider trading that “nothing—
not wars, not recessions, not political uncertainties—does greater
damage to confidence in securities markets than the perception that
trading is not elementally fair to all” 227 seems at least potentially
incorrect in that fraud and corporate collapse are possibly more
damaging to confidence than is insider trading. 228 Recognizing the lack
of empirical evidence to support the thesis that insider trading damages
investor confidence may lead utilitarian-minded scholars and policymakers to a more open-minded stance toward insider trading. As a
result, they may be willing to at least consider legalizing those forms of
insider trading that could lower the risk of what appears to inflict greater
damage to confidence—corporate fraud. As mentioned and as will be
discussed further below, the model of legalized fraud-inhibiting insider
trading presented in this Article seeks to achieve precisely the goal of
preventing future Enron and WorldCom-type situations, thus bolstering
confidence in the market.
B. The Property Argument
One of the other major justifications behind the prohibition on insider
trading is that it protects property rights in information as opposed to
investors. 229 The argument relies on the idea that regulating insider
trading gives an incentive for companies to produce socially valuable
information. 230 In this framework, insider trading represents a theft of
corporate property. 231 Many scholars and judges feel that the property
rationale is the strongest basis for prohibiting insider trading. In United
States v. Chestman, Judge Winter stated:
227. Jalil, supra note 101, at 710–11.
228. Of course, the evidence presented here cannot conclusively refute the possibility that insider
trading damages investor confidence. It is the case, however, that the proponents of that hypothesis both
carry the burden of proof and have so far not provided empirical evidence supporting their claim.
Additionally, alternative explanations of the data presented here, such as that insider trading did damage
confidence but that other factors restored it, appear unlikely. One such theory would be that one or
several very publicized positive events canceled out the effect of the Boesky and Miliken scandal. It is,
however, not clear which event could have played this role in that particular time period. Some
individuals may also posit that the government perhaps responded really effectively to the scandal and
restored confidence that way. No actual significant measures were taken for several years, however, and
the perpetrators received no punishments until much later (and arguably moderate ones at that).
229. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1606.
230. Id.
231. MACEY, supra note 64, at 44.
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Information is perhaps the most precious commodity in commercial
markets. It is expensive to produce, and, because it involves facts and
ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried in one’s head, there is a
ubiquitous risk that those who pay to produce information will see others
reap the profit from it. Where the profit from an activity is likely to be
diverted, investment in that activity will decline. If the law fails to
protect property rights in commercial information, therefore, less will be
invested in generating such information. 232

The Supreme Court also endorsed the property rationale for insider
trading regulation in O’Hagan when it stated that “[a] company’s
confidential information . . . qualifies as property to which the company
has a right of exclusive use.” 233 One property-based argument in favor
of insider trading regulation is rooted in the premise that because the
information is socially desirable, the law should provide incentives to
create it, and insider trading regulation is such an incentive. 234 This
incentive motivation is, however, only applicable in some insider trading
settings, such as the situation in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case where the
information that minerals existed on a piece of land was expensive to
discover and valuable to those that planned to collect them. Fraudinhibiting insider trading scenarios, however, are different because the
information there is typically not developed, but usually appears on its
own and may cause significant loss in value to the corporation. One
example would be a setting where a manager naturally finds out without
extensive investigation that the price of raw materials that the company
needs has unexpectedly gone up or that fewer consumers are buying the
company’s products.
One proponent of the property justification is Jonathan Macey, who
contends that “the search for a coherent justification for prohibiting
insider trading is over: the right to trade on a piece of information about
a corporation is simply a part of the larger, and more venerable, question
of whether and how to allocate property rights in intangible things.”235
He further argues that insider trading can and should be regulated
consistent with principles of fairness and fiduciary duty where this
enforcement “will support a system of economic incentives that enhance
social welfare and create incentives for the efficient allocation of
resources.” 236 Macey concludes that the property right (or ability to
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

947 F.2d 551, 576–77 (2d Cir. 1991).
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
Cox & Fogarty, supra note 80, at 359.
MACEY, supra note 64, at 2.
Id.
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trade on inside information) “ought to be allocated within the firm to
maximize the welfare of the investors,” which sometimes will be
benefited by the public disclosure of inside information and other times
will not. 237 Macey thinks that inside traders who “abscond with
valuable corporate information in breach of a preexisting fiduciary
relationship should be punished.” 238 Henry Manne also stated that
inside information could be classified as a valuable property right,239
and many other scholars support this position. 240
While the position favoring insider trading regulation on a property
rights basis is certainly not universal, 241 it holds plenty of support.
Given the current alternatives, the property analysis seems to be the
most appropriate and is based upon a utilitarian premise, which as this
Article has discussed, is the most consistent framework to analyze
insider trading. Yet, there are still a few lingering problems. For one,
Macey and others believe that insider trading should be illegal if the
inside trader “has no legitimate property interest in the information” 242
being used in the trade or where the trader has a legal duty to keep the
information confidential and refrain from acting on it, 243 but as this
Article has indicated, it is not always a good idea to prohibit insider
trading under those circumstances. Furthermore, Macey would allow
short-selling in his theory of insider trading. 244 While his position has
its merits, it does not appear to address the risk of upper-management
employees using their position in a way that could affirmatively hurt the
corporation while making them wealthy through short-selling. For
example, a manager could decide to fail to solve a problem within the
company, knowing it will get larger and become public in a few months,
while simultaneously making money by short-selling stock options once
237. Id. at 3.
238. Id. at 4.
239. MANNE, supra note 2, at 47–57.
240. For instance, Michael Dooley has also come to the conclusion that insider trading should
really concern itself with property rights. Dooley, supra note 65, at 321. Stephen Bainbridge similarly
states that “the insider trading prohibition is justified solely by the need to protect property rights in
valuable information.” Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 1192.
241. At least one commentator has argued that “[t]he view that inside information is a property
right that insiders should be permitted to exploit is morally obnoxious and legally unsound. Simply put,
it is an attempt to transform the dark side of capitalism into a public good but it wholly ignores the
public interest and public opinion.” Karmel, supra note 189, at 168 (internal citations omitted).
242. Macey, supra note 33, at 1902.
243. Id. at 1910.
244. Id. See also Jonathan Macey, The Government Is Contributing to the Panic, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 11, 2008, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122367942018324645.html
(explaining that prohibitions on short-selling “prevent the market from imposing discipline on banks
guilty of massive over-leveraging and excessive risk-taking” and “punish[ ] savvy traders who invested
resources and effort in identifying companies with too much debt and unrealistically valued assets”).
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the stock price of the company drops. The proposal in this Article,
which would only allow fraud-inhibiting insider trading and not other
forms of insider trading such as short-selling, does not have this
potential downfall. 245
Some commentators have proposed that Congress develop a statutory
framework that clearly establishes insider trading as a crime based on
the “property rights in information” theory. 246 This model could be
consistent with an adoption of the fraud-inhibiting insider trading
proposal. In the statutory framework, it should be made clear that fraudinhibiting insider trading would establish a safe harbor somewhat similar
to the criminal defense of necessity. 247 The defense of necessity is often
referred to as a “choice of evils,” and includes the idea that “[i]f the
harm that will result from compliance with the law is greater than that
which will result from the violation of it, [an individual] is by virtue of
the defense of necessity justified in violating it.” 248 At times, society
will experience greater benefits from allowing someone to break the law
in this manner than having her refrain and cause even worse damage. 249
Typical elements of the defense are: (1) a harm to be avoided (the larger
harm) and a lesser harm necessary to avoid the former (the smaller
harm); (2) an intention to avoid the larger harm; (3) no alternative course
of action; and (4) no fault on the part of the defendant in bringing about
the situation. 250 Fraud-inhibiting insider trading does not fit this scheme
perfectly and would accordingly require specific statutory provisions
addressing it within any criminal law dealing with insider trading, but
drawing some analogies to the classic necessity defense is nevertheless
instructive.
Considering the first element of the defense in the context of fraudinhibiting insider trading, the larger harm is the virtual destruction of the
corporation that can and almost certainly will occur if a potential fraud is
245. The property rights rationale also need not imply a categorical ban on insider trading if one
considers the possibility that insiders may in fact be paying for the ability to trade on information that
they have acquired. If, as discussed previously, executive compensation is reduced when such trading is
liberalized, one could characterize the situation as one where the corporation is selling its property and
thereby benefitting both the corporation as a whole and individual shareholders. See supra text
accompanying notes 163–167.
246. Painter, supra note 77, at 226.
247. For example, some courts have specifically stated that “economic necessity” per se in the
sense of a defendant’s lack of funds is insufficient to constitute a defense; this would remain true, but an
insider trading defendant would have a statutory defense if she could show that she met the fraudinhibiting insider trading factors delineated in this Article. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW 123 (2d ed. 2003) (citing State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638 (Wash. 1933)).
248. Id. at 116.
249. Id. at 118.
250. Id. at 124–33.
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perpetrated, and the smaller harm is the violation of general insider
trading regulations. The second element is more complicated in this
context because the motivating factor is usually not the preservation of
the corporation and shareholders’ interests. If the trader were that
altruistically minded, she might accept personal economic devastation
and commit neither the fraud nor the insider trading. At the same time,
this asks too much of most CEO/CFO level executives, and having even
one such individual commit fraud can have disastrous consequences if
she happens to be placed in a high-level position within a large
corporation. Therefore, in the statutory safe harbor for fraud-inhibiting
insider trading, this element should require individuals to have “an
intention to avoid the financial devastation that not trading would cause”
if the only other alternatives are further types of unlawful conduct. For
the third element, it is questionable whether there is ever another
alternative that will cause less harm than that caused by violating the
general prohibition on insider trading. Technically, one option is not
trading and not committing fraud, but it is unclear that failing to trade
will result in less harm than trading. Trading tends to bring about less
harm than fraudulent activity that could destroy the company, but it also
may not necessarily cause more harm on an individual basis than failing
to trade. There is often no person that is likely to be harmed even
fractionally, if at all, by an insider’s trading as much as the insider will
be harmed if he refrains from trading. 251
When an insider trades with other individuals in the market, there is
typically no increase in the total amount of harm. If the stock goes
down, there is the same reduction in stock value regardless of who owns
it. If the owner of that stock is an executive that has most of his net
worth tied up in the stock, however, the negative impact may be
magnified. If a thousand people buy stock for $2,000 dollars each, and
it drops to a value of $1,000 resulting in a loss to each shareholder of
$1,000 and a total loss of $1 million, most investors are equipped to deal
with that loss; yet, one executive who personally suffers a loss of $1
million may not be able to deal with that and may be ruined. Thus, in
the former scenario, nobody is essentially ruined whereas in the latter,
one person is. Therefore, there is arguably no alternative besides insider
trading that will cause less economic harm overall in such a situation.
The fourth element could remain the same: the defendant must bear

251. One could construct a scenario in which an individual is about to trade his over-valued stock
when a second individual’s insider trading sends a signal to the market, which then in turn decreases the
stock price and the first individual loses a potential profit if he did not trade yet. This is, however,
extremely unlikely and is in any case outweighed by the other disadvantages of prohibiting fraudinhibiting insider trading.
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no intentional fault in bringing about the situation that gave rise to the
need for insider trading. In the two examples of WorldCom and
Supercuts, what brought the situations about were the increased costs
and reduced revenues that were going to cause a fall in stock value.
Furthermore, the safe harbor offered for fraud-inhibiting insider trading
should include a provision disallowing insider trading if the individual
has already participated in fraudulent activity that will detrimentally
affect the corporation when publicly revealed.
VII. OTHER OBJECTIONS TO AND BENEFITS OF INSIDER TRADING
This Part briefly addresses some of the other objections that
commentators have raised against insider trading, and specifically how
they relate to the fraud-inhibiting insider trading model. It also shows
some further benefits to allowing fraud-inhibiting insider trading on top
of the reduction of corporate fraud.
The first additional argument for prohibiting insider trading is based
on some of the direct harms that it could inflict on corporations. For
example, if an insider knows about a pending acquisition that the
corporation intends to make and she trades based on this information, it
is possible that this could cause the price of the acquisition to increase
and thereby harm the corporation. 252 This particular harm is generally
limited to profit-increasing insider trading and does not apply to fraudinhibiting insider trading. 253
The second concern could be the
possibility that if investors knew that employees were engaging in
insider trading, this could cause a reputational harm to the corporation.
It is difficult to give much weight to this argument under these
circumstances because an investor, unlikely to be harmed by an insider’s
trading in a fraud-inhibiting insider trading scenario, would have little
reason to develop negative feelings toward that insider’s corporation,
and hence, the corporation’s reputation would usually remain intact. 254
Also, under the fraud-inhibiting insider trading proposal, an investor is
likely to benefit much more than lose from any insider trading in a
corporation, and he may therefore be more likely to invest and view the
reputation of the firm in a positive light.

252. Lambert, supra note 7, at 1097.
253. Furthermore, under the scheme proposed in this Article, corporations could still contractually
prevent executives from engaging in insider trading and might choose to do so for industry-specific or
other individual reasons.
254. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 12–16 (1993); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 172.
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The final argument requiring mention is that general agency
principles and fiduciary duties justify the prohibition of insider trading.
The idea is that an agent is typically restricted by his fiduciary duties
from using confidential information from the principal either in
competition with or to the injury of the principal without the principal’s
consent. 255 Judge Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have pointed
out that the legal principle of “duty of loyalty” should be defined with
the consideration in mind that “because the process is contractual—
because both principal and agent enter this understanding for gain—the
details should be those that maximize that gain, which the contracting
parties can divide.” 256 Furthermore, “legal rules can promote the
benefits of contractual endeavors in a world of scarce information and
high transactions costs by prescribing the outcomes the parties
themselves would have reached had information been plentiful and
negotiations costless.” 257 Given this analysis, the agency/fiduciary duty
analysis of insider trading has basically the same result as the previously
discussed contractarian position. As Judge Easterbrook and Fischel
explain,
a “fiduciary” relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high
costs of specification and monitoring. The duty of loyalty replaces
detailed contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by
prescribing the actions the parties themselves would have preferred if
bargaining were cheap and all promises fully enforced. 258

Given the option, most people may contract to allow fraud-inhibiting
insider trading because it would usually maximize everyone’s gains and
minimize potential losses. Furthermore, with fraud-inhibiting insider
trading, the trader would not be in competition with the principal—the
corporation—which could potentially benefit investors because the firm
could reduce the amount of executive compensation. 259 Finally, it
would be understood both at the corporate and investor level that the
inside trader would be authorized to trade in these circumstances, and
therefore, the trader would have the principal’s consent. Easterbrook
and Fischel point out that “a court setting out to protect principals from
their agents must use the hypothetical contract approach; the only
alternative is to injure the persons the rule makers want to help.” 260 By
255. Pritchard, supra note 133, at 47.
256. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON.
425, 426 (1993).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 427.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 163–167.
260. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 256, at 431.
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prohibiting fraud-inhibiting insider trading, the rule makers are often
effectively hurting exactly the parties that they are tasked to protect.
Allowing fraud-inhibiting insider trading would not only respond to
these objections but also create a number of advantages in addition to
reducing the incentives to commit fraud. Most economists agree that
insider trading will usually produce more accurate stock prices because
it results in more accurate information reaching the market. 261 In fact,
there is considerable agreement that insider trading pushes stock prices
in the correct direction, with some disagreement over the speed of this
push. 262 The argument is that “trading by better-informed insiders is
what causes share prices to adjust to new information, and since insiders
will inevitably be the first to have access to it, permitting them to trade
will ensure a quick adjustment to market prices.” 263
Additionally, insider trading can be superior to other forms of
disclosure because it is usually more believable. 264 Financial experts are
often slow to change long-standing trading recommendations. For
example, even after Enron’s CFO had been forced to resign, the SEC
had launched investigations, and the Wall Street Journal had published
stories about Enron’s problems, the majority of large Wall Street firms
still recommended buying Enron stock. 265 If individuals “in the know”
suddenly sell their own stock, however, this is likely to get people’s
attention. A frequent criticism of that type of efficiency argument is that
the trades are hidden, and therefore, the information does not reach the
market. 266 This criticism is at most a condemnation of insufficient
disclosure requirements and not one against insider trading itself; the
point holds even less weight when it comes to fraud-inhibiting insider
trading because the executives who would be able to engage in it are
already under higher disclosure requirements based on § 16. 267
Finally, fraud-inhibiting insider trading can assist with better aligning
manager interests with shareholder interests in some situations. One
scholar provides the following example relevant to this point:
Sue, the CEO of Acme, Inc., has 100 shares of vested stock; the stock is
trading at $10 per share. Sue has the choice of two projects: Project A

261. Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
269, 276 (1999) (citing Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO
J. 933, 934 (1985)).
262. Manne, supra note 88, at 169.
263. MACEY, supra note 64, at 11.
264. Id. at 46.
265. Lambert, supra note 7, at 1070.
266. Pritchard, supra note 133, at 52.
267. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). See supra Part III.
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has a 70 percent of increasing the stock price to $15 in one year, and a 30
percent chance of decreasing the stock price to $8 over the same period;
Project B has a 70 percent chance of increasing the stock price to $20,
and a 30 percent chance of decreasing the stock price to zero.
Diversified, risk-neutral shareholders prefer Project B, since its expected
value ($14) exceeds that of Project A ($13). Sue, however, prefers
project A, since the 30 percent chance of failure in Project B will result in
not only economic losses, but also likely her job. Here we see classic
agency cost problems – managers [sic] interests are not fully aligned with
those of shareholders. 268

Allowing fraud-inhibiting insider trading would increase the odds of Sue
choosing Project B, which is the shareholders’ preferred course of
action, because she would at least have the ability to sell her stock if she
became aware that she might soon suffer a major loss, which would
happen 30% of the time. Hence, in this kind of scenario, both the
manager and the shareholders would be better off if the manager was
allowed to engage in insider trading.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Henry Manne asked the question forty years ago in his seminal work
Insider Trading and the Stock Market: 269 “[w]ho is harmed by trading
on the basis of non-public information?” 270 Many have since made the
claim that insider trading in fact has no victims. 271 This controversial
question need not be answered in absolute terms. Rather, the argument
here addresses a simpler question: is the current absolute prohibition on
insider trading the optimal choice to maximize society’s financial wellbeing? This Article explains that this is likely not the case. Using
fraud-inhibiting insider trading may result in better outcomes for
virtually everyone involved and should be implemented as soon as
possible. Furthermore, given the fact that insider trading regulation has
had more changes in its brief history than most corporate law rules, 272
the corporate world should be able to adapt to this change without large
upheaval.
There are three options to begin implementing the fraud-inhibiting
268. Henderson, supra note 163, at 40 (footnote omitted). Henderson calculated the expected
values by multiplying the probability of a particular state of the world with the stock price that would
result in that state (i.e., for Project A this would mean 70% x $15 + 30% x $8 = $13 and for Project B
70% x $20 + 30% x $0 = $14). Id. at 40 n.74.
269. MANNE, supra note 2.
270. Macey, supra note 261.
271. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 161.
272. Id. at 4.
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insider trading proposal. 273 The clearest and most obviously effective
one would be for Congress to amend the Securities Exchange Act,
specifically § 10b, to make it clear that trading done in conformity with
fraud-inhibiting insider trading should not be prosecutable under the
securities laws and regulations. Congress has stated that insider trading
prohibitions are “necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for
the protection of investors.” 274 Lawmakers should follow the same
rationale to implement a fraud-inhibiting insider trading safe harbor to
protect investors. While having Congress amend the law is in some
ways the most direct method to open the door to fraud-inhibiting insider
trading, it may also be the most difficult from a political viewpoint
because of the visceral reaction that many people have to insider trading.
A second option would be for federal courts to begin dismissing
charges against defendants that have committed insider trading in the
fraud-inhibiting insider trading context. There are at least two possible
ways in which courts could legitimately accomplish this. The first
would be to use the definition of insider trading that Justice Powell’s
opinion in Dirks established. He wrote that two elements are required
for a Rule 10b-5 violation: “(i) the existence of a relationship affording
access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.” 275 Courts
could hold that it is not “unfair” in a fraud-inhibiting insider trading
scenario to allow insider trading, and therefore, under these
circumstances it is not appropriate for a Rule 10b-5 prosecution to
proceed.
The other basis for a court to reject a fraud-inhibiting insider trading
prosecution would be grounded in the modifications implemented
through § 21(d)(5) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which authorizes federal
courts to grant “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary
for the benefit of investors.” 276 Courts could rule that under fraudinhibiting insider trading conditions, what is “appropriate or necessary”
for the benefit of investors is to dismiss any charges that have been filed.
While some may view the idea of using courts to implement this
273. It should be noted that under all three options, if a state wants to maintain a state prohibition
of this type of trading, it would still be able to do so. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y.
1969) (ruling in a derivative suit against the chairman of the board and president of the company that
state law prohibited the sale of their shares in the company before bad financial news was released). But
see Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975) (declining to follow Oreamuno); Freeman v. Decio,
584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (same).
274. Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 1232 (citation omitted).
275. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (emphasis added).
276. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006).
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proposal as radical at first blush, doing so could serve as one of the
logical means to modify a doctrine that was rooted in judicial initiatives
to begin with. As described in Part IV, supra, the courts played a crucial
role in criminalizing insider trading, especially through their expansive
interpretation of Rule 10b-5. In a series of cases, they continued to
define the contours of the insider trading doctrine and what behaviors
should fall under the purview of Rule 10b-5. Hence, removing fraudinhibiting insider trading from the scope of criminal punishments mainly
constitutes a correction of a past mistake by courts—that of providing
sanctions against this form of trading without regard to how it might
encourage fraudulent behavior.
The third possibility to implement a fraud-inhibiting insider trading
safe harbor would be for the SEC to modify its existing rules to make it
clear that this type of insider trading is an exception to the general
prohibition. Former Supreme Court Justice and former SEC Chairman
William O. Douglas stated that the SEC is supposed to focus on being
“the investor’s advocate.” 277 Even if, as previously pointed out, the
SEC has an interest in maximizing its jurisdiction and budget, this safe
harbor would do little to reduce the SEC’s domain because the agency
would still need to verify that the inside trades did in fact qualify for the
safe harbor. 278 The SEC itself has also argued that “[t]he broad
congressional purposes behind the [securities laws are] to protect
investors from false and misleading practices that might harm them.” 279
Therefore, the rules that apply should be those that best meet this
objective. 280
Whether Congress, the courts, or the SEC take on this issue, what is
most important is that insider trading rules reflect economic realities and
protect both investors and society at large. This Article has argued that
one can change insider trading regulations without decreasing investor
confidence or infringing against corporations’ property rights. Allowing
fraud-inhibiting insider trading would help to avert WorldCom-scale
disasters and improve stock valuations without quite unleashing an army

277. Levitt, supra note 149, at 1.
278. Hopefully, this SEC could do a better job of advocating for investors than the first “SEC”
did—the Securities and Exchange Company is the name that Charles Ponzi of “Ponzi scheme” fame
gave to his business! See Eichenwald, supra note 35.
279. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1604 (citing Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164,
173–74 (1994)); accord SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining that
the goal of the SEC is to protect investors).
280. This Article recognizes that insider trading regulation is an area subject to a complex
interplay of federal, state, and local forces. While changing the federal rules would therefore not
necessarily be sufficient in isolation to legalize fraud-inhibiting insider trading across the board, it would
be the most critical step in doing so and would pave the way for localized reforms as well.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

43

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
F-WAGNER

1016

8/3/2011 10:11:48 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

of Gordon Gekkos onto Wall Street.
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